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ARTICLES
SETTING PARENTAL CONTROLS:
DO PARENTS HAVE A DUTY TO
SUPERVISE THEIR CHILDREN’S USE
OF THE INTERNET?
ALBERTO BERNABE*
Toward the end of 2014, some in the legal media announced that
the Georgia Appellate Court had issued a landmark opinion 1 holding for
the first time that parents may be liable for failing to supervise their
children’s activities on the Internet or for the consequences of their
children’s comments online. The Wall Street Journal law blog, for example, published a story in which it stated that the court ruled that
“[p]arents can be held liable for what their kids post on Facebook” 2 and
that the decision “marked a legal precedent on the issue of parental responsibility over their children’s online activity.” 3 Other outlets stated
that this was “a landmark case”4 and that it was the first to recognize or
impose a parental duty to supervise children’s use of the Internet. 5 The
news seemed to be delivered as a warning to parents that they now
needed to be more vigilant about their children’s conduct on the Inter*
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago).
1. Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
2. See Jacob Gershman, Parents May Be Liable for What Their Kids Post on Facebook, Court Rules, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2014, 4:33 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/10/15/parents-may-be-liable-for-what-their-kids-post-onfacebook-court-rules.
3. Id.
4. John
Delaney,
Socially
Aware,
JD
SUPRA
(Oct.
21,
2014),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/status-updates-october-2014-9-03152.
5. June Grasso & Michael Beat, Bloomberg Law: Facebook Posts and Parental Liability,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Nov.
3,
2014,
6:21PM),
http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/v_p69nUaWuZw.mp3 (stating that parents can be
held liable if their children post defamatory statements on the internet).
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net lest they face possible liability for their children’s conduct.
While this is a very interesting issue, there is a problem: these
news stories were wrong. The court did not hold that parents can be
held liable for their children’s conduct or for the consequences of their
children’s comments, nor that there is a duty to supervise a child’s Internet use. The court only held that parents can be held liable for their
own conduct once the parents are on notice that something needs to be
done to prevent a foreseeable injury to another. The difference is important. Had the court held the former, it certainly would have been
taking a new view on issues of parental responsibility. By holding the
latter, on the other hand, it merely applied old principles of tort law to
new circumstances. Parents do not need to be more worried than they
already are. Supervising their children’s activities is never a bad idea,
but parents are not exposed to more liability today than they have been
in the past.
I
The facts of the case in question, Boston v. Athearn, are relatively
straight forward.6 A boy (Dustin) and a girl (Melissa) decided to have
some fun at a classmate’s expense. Using a computer supplied by
Dustin’s parents for his use, Dustin and Melissa created a fake Facebook page in the plaintiff’s name where they posted racist and sexually
graphic comments, and false information including posts that suggested
the plaintiff was a homosexual and a racist, that she took illegal drugs,
and that she was on medication for a mental health disorder. Dustin
and Melissa also issued invitations to become “Facebook friends” to
many of the plaintiff’s classmates, teachers, and extended family members. Within a day or two, the account was connected as “Facebook
friends” to over 70 other Facebook users.
Suspecting who had created the page, the plaintiff’s parents approached the principal of the kids’ school. The principal quickly determined who had created the Facebook page and imposed discipline. 7 As
a result, Dustin’s parents were informed of his conduct. Dustin’s parents claimed they disciplined him, but they made no effort to access the
Facebook page or to delete it. As a result, the page remained available
for almost a year.
The plaintiff sued Dustin and his parents for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In turn, Dustin’s parents
moved for a summary judgment, which the lower court granted. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal reversed in part, agreeing with the
plaintiff that there were questions of material fact regarding whether
6. Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582, 583-84 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
7. It only took the principal six days from the day the Facebook page was created
to identify those responsible for it and to notify their parents. Id.
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the defendants were negligent in failing to take action to delete the Facebook page once they had been notified of their son’s conduct.
As the court explained in its opinion, “liability for the tort of a minor child is not imputed to the child’s parents merely on the basis of the
parent-child relationship.”8 In other words, there is generally no vicarious liability for the conduct of a minor.9 Also, courts are reluctant to
recognize possible causes of action against parents when doing so could
result in the imposition of liability based on a value judgment of the
parents’ personal decisions involving how to discipline or raise their
children.10
However, as the court explains, “[p]arents may be held directly liable . . . for their own negligence in failing to supervise or control their
child with regard to conduct which poses an unreasonable risk of harming others,”11 a duty which extends to those plaintiffs whose harm is
foreseeable. Thus, again, because the court is saying that the possible
liability is direct, as opposed to vicarious, the court is clearly not holding that parents would be liable for their children’s conduct on the Internet. Also, even though the court does say that parents may have a
duty to supervise their children’s conduct on the Internet, the duty depends on whether the child’s conduct in using a computer to access the
Internet is considered to be “conduct which poses unreasonable risk of
harming others.”12
8.
9.

Id. at 585.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 41 reporter’s note on cmt. d (2012) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 913 (5th ed. 1984)). On the other hand, it should
be noted that some states have enacted statutes that impose vicarious liability on parents
in limited circumstances, some limited to wilful and malicious conduct. See, e.g., LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West 2015); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-2-2 (West 2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. §
577-3 (West 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15 (2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West
2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West 2015).
10. See JOHN DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS, 242 (4th ed. 2010) (“the persistence of the parent-child immunity can be explained, in part, by a reluctance to have
judicial review over what constitutes acceptable parenting”); Shoemake v. Fogel, 826
S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1992) (parental immunity is designed to prevent judicial interference
with parental discretion).
11. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d at 585.
12. Although the court does not discuss it, one basis for this type of potential liability can now be found in section 41(b) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM. According to this section, in certain circumstances,
an actor in a special relationship with another owes a duty of reasonable care to third parties with regard to risks posed by the other that arise within the scope of the relationship.
However, as explained in the Reporter’s Note to section 41, “[b]efore liability may be imposed on parents, they must act negligently with regard to risks posed by their minor
children [and] . . . [t]here must be a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 41 reporter’s note on
cmt. d (2012). The Reporter’s Note to the section explains that there are cases affirming
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It would be a stretch to conclude that simply using a computer to
access the Internet creates a foreseeable risk of harm. Something else
must happen to create that foreseeability. Therefore, the court’s conclusion must be interpreted to be that parents have a duty to act if the
parents know, or should know, that their children have engaged, or are
engaging, in conduct that can be reasonably expected to cause injury.
The basis for such a duty can be found in section 39 of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, which states that “[w]hen an actor’s
prior conduct . . . creates a continuing risk of physical harm of a type
characteristic of the conduct, the actor has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent or minimize the harm.” 13 According to this view, in Boston v. Athearn, the duty recognized by the court would not have started
until after the defendants knew of their son’s conduct. Once the parents
were informed of their son’s conduct, they should have realized the risk,
and because they did not take measures to prevent more harm from
happening, they could be liable for the injury that resulted. To reiterate
this point the court cites a number of cases14 that discuss the general
principle that parents may be liable for negligence in failing to exercise
reasonable care to prevent their child from creating an unreasonable
risk of harm to third persons if the parents have knowledge of facts
from which they should reasonably anticipate that harm will otherwise
result.
In sum, the parents did not have a duty to monitor or control their
son’s use of the Internet. They just had a duty to use reasonable care to
act once they were informed their son’s conduct was causing harm and
could foreseeably continue to cause harm in the future. In so holding,
unlike what some of the headlines discussing the case have implied, the
court did not create new law. The court simply applied accepted principles of tort law to a new situation. 15

the existence of an affirmative duty to third parties based on the parent-child relationship
(citing Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272 (Ariz. 1973); Linder v. Bidner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Moore v. Crumpton, 295 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1982); Isbell v. Ryan, 983
S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App. 1998); and Nieuwendorp v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 594
(Wis. 1995)). Id.
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §39, “Duty Based on Prior Conduct Creating a
Risk of Physical Harm.” Also, as the comment to this section explains, “[i]f at the time of
the conduct an actor reasonably fails to appreciate the risk, but later appreciates or
should appreciate the risk, the actor must employ reasonable care to prevent the harm
from occurring.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM §39 cmt. a (2012).
14. The court cites Hill v. Morrison, 286 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Assurance
Co. of Am. v. Bell, 134 S.E.2d 540, 540-41 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963); Kitchens v. Harris, 701
S.E.2d 207, 208-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); McNamee v. A.J.W., 519 S.E.2d 298, 300-01 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1999); Mayer v. Self, 341 S.E.2d 924, 924-25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
15. See comments by Eugene Volokh during the podcast Facebook Posts and Parental Liability. Grasso & Best, supra note 5.
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II
The court’s analysis, however, opens the door to a different question: should the use of a computer be considered to be inherently dangerous? As mentioned above, courts would not impose a duty on the
parents unless the parents have some knowledge that their negligent
supervision would create an unreasonable risk of harm. In most cases,
this would require notice of a child’s past conduct. However, in cases involving injuries caused by the use of an inherently dangerous instrumentality, some courts have held that the nature of the instrumentality
itself provides enough notice to the parents to create a duty to supervise
that would otherwise not arise until the parents have notice of prior
conduct of the child.16 Thus, there could be liability if parents negligently allow a child access to a loaded gun, even if the child has never
played with the gun or caused an injury to others in the past, because it
is reasonably foreseeable that, given the nature of the gun, failing to
supervise creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 17
This raises the question of whether a computer with Internet access should be considered to be an inherently dangerous instrumentality. Given its potential to distribute hurtful information by reaching so
many people with ease, we can certainly understand how a computer
can become a dangerous instrumentality. In fact, we have created a new
word to describe the use of the Internet as a dangerous instrumentality:
“cyberbullying.” And we know of numerous cases where cyberbullying
has resulted in injury, even suicide.
However, just like it would be a stretch to conclude that simply using a computer to access the Internet creates a foreseeable risk of harm,
it would be a stretch to hold that, in and of itself, a computer with In16. See, e.g., Hill v. Morrison, 286 S.E.2d 467, 468-469 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (where a
person “entrusts another with a dangerous instrument under circumstances that he has
reason to know are likely to produce injury, [that person] is liable for the ensuing consequences”); Muse v. Ozment, 264 S.E.2d 328, 329 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (prohibiting recovery
against a parent for a child’s tort “where the parent has no special reason to anticipate”
that the child may harm another, either because of the child’s “known dangerous proclivities” to engage in the conduct that caused the injury or because of the child’s “possession
of [inherently] dangerous instrumentalities”); Assurance Co. of Am. v. Bell, 134 S.E.2d
540, 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (“[P]arents may be liable where they have entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to their children or have failed to restrain their children who they
know possess dangerous tendencies.”).
17. Jacobs v. Tyson, 407 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (A jury could find that a
child’s parents were on notice of the risk of injury where they kept a pistol in their house
loaded and in a location where it was accessible to their 12–year–old while he was present
in the home with another child without adult supervision, since, “[u]nlike a butcher knife
or a golf club, a loaded firearm may be considered an inherently dangerous instrumentality”); McBerry v. Ivie, 159 S.E.2d 108, 110-111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (A jury could find that
a child’s parents were on notice of the risk of injury from a shotgun “which was a dangerous instrument” furnished to a 13–year–old child by his parents without reasonable instruction and supervision as to its use).
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ternet access should be considered to be an inherently dangerous instrumentality. Citing several cases, the court in Boston v. Athearn suggests that “an instrumentality is not inherently dangerous if it is not
likely to cause serious injury when used in a proper manner and with
due care but only becomes dangerous if it is intentionally used to cause
injury or is handled in a reckless and dangerous manner.”18
This definition should apply to a computer. Even though a computer can be used to cause harm, it is not the nature of the computer itself
that creates the risk of harm. A computer can be used for many purposes and in many ways and it is most often not a dangerous object, particularly if used with reasonable care. In fact, you could make the argument that, if there is a problem, the problem is not with the computer,
but with “the Internet” which is what allows people to connect and
communicate online.
For this reason, as stated above, even though a computer can be
used to cause harm, given that it should not be considered to be inherently dangerous, the possible liability for the parents of a child who
causes harm using a computer should be limited to cases where the
parents know or should know of the child’s past or current harmful conduct, or, at least, of the child’s past propensity for dangerous conduct.
Applied to the facts in Boston v. Athearn, the answer to the issue is
relatively simple. The parents not only knew of the past conduct and
the injury already caused, but also knew or should have known that the
information posted on the Internet could cause further injury in the future. For this reason, it can easily be argued they had a duty to take action to eliminate the risk of further injury.
III
Ultimately, the analysis of the court is correct and the result logical. The court however, does not answer all the important questions.
First of all, determining whether the parents exercised reasonable care
necessarily depends on the circumstances, and, thus, is generally a
question for the jury. The parents have a duty to act like reasonable
prudent persons under the circumstances and, given the facts, reasonable people can disagree as to whether they did. Thus, this aspect of the
claim was correctly remanded to the trial court.
More importantly, it is not very clear how the decision to recognize
possible liability for the parents’ lack of action with respect to the information posted by the child relates to the actual claims alleged in the
complaint. First, given that intentional infliction of emotional distress
is an intentional tort, the negligence-based analysis related to a duty to
prevent further future foreseeable harm is irrelevant. Thus, whether
18. Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582, 585 n.7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Saenz v.
Andrus, 393 S.E.2d 724, 725-726 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)).
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the plaintiff will be able to support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress will not depend on the analysis related to the parents’ duty.
That leaves the claim for defamation, and the court’s short discussion of one of the most interesting questions raised by the claim: how
can the defendants have defamed the plaintiff if they did not make the
statements about the plaintiff? Even though it is generally accepted
that one who repeats or republishes a defamatory statement commits
defamation just as much as the person who made the original statement,19 in Boston v. Athearn, the parents did not repeat or republish the
statement. They merely did not act to delete it.
Understanding this problem, the plaintiff tried to argue that, in
addition to their legal duty as parents, the defendants had a duty as
landowners to remove the defamatory content that existed on their
property.20 In other words, they analogized the circumstances to a case
where a landowner could be liable for not erasing defamatory graffiti. 21
The court rejected this argument, however, implying that the analogy is not entirely convincing because it is not clear you can equate a
statement placed on the Internet with one physically exhibited on a
piece of property.22 More importantly, the court concluded that the
plaintiff did not prove that the defendants had the ability to remove the
defamatory statement.
For this reason, the court dismissed the claim based on this theory
of recovery, which raises the original question again. If the defendants
did not issue the original statement and did not commit defamation by
republication either, how can they be liable for defamation at all?
Given the court’s analysis, the basis of the defamation claim can
only be that the parents did not act reasonably to delete the statement
according to the duty the court first recognized in the opinion. But, as
discussed above, this duty is based on the notion that when the defendant’s conduct “creates a continuing risk of physical harm of a type characteristic of the conduct, the actor has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent or minimize the harm.” 23 Thus, at least as explained in
the Restatement, the possibility of imposing liability for not taking
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977) (one who repeats or otherwise
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it).
20. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d at 587.
21. To support the argument, the plaintiff cited a dissenting opinion in S. Bell Tel.
& Tel. v. Coastal Transmission Serv., 307 S.E.2d 83, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), which cited
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977), which provides that “[o]ne who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for
its continued publication.”
22. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d at 588.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 39 (2012).
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measures to minimize or eliminate foreseeable future harm is based on
the possibility of future physical injury while the plaintiff in Boston v.
Athearn argued that it should be extended to protect from future emotional or dignitary injuries as well. 24
The court does not address this aspect of the litigation and it is this
issue that should have attracted the attention of those who reviewed
the case rather than the mistaken view that the case created a duty to
supervise a child’s computer use or that it recognized a new form of vicarious liability. Implying that the parents can be liable to the plaintiff
for a non-physical injury is not problematic if the court is ready to say
that a plaintiff should have a cause of action for any injury as long as
the plaintiff can show that the injury is a foreseeable consequence of the
risk created by the negligent conduct. However, many courts are reluctant to reach this general conclusion if the injury claimed is purely emotional, or dignitary as it is in this case. It remains to be seen if the court
will eventually find that the defendant’s duty extends to include nonphysical injuries. Once this issue is addressed, maybe Boston v. Athearn
will be a landmark decision after all.

24.

Athearn, 764 S.E.2d at 587.

